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since it ultimately becomes a question for national debate and solution by representative bodies. Why not leave unspecified constitutional rights with the legislatures in the first place?
It is unlikely that a national consensus will ever be reached on
a fixed set of rules for the exercise of judicial review so long as right
and wrong remain relative terms determined by counting votes.
Only if we return to the founders' public philosophy can we retain
the spirit of constitutional government. Otherwise, constitutional
choices are made on the basis of personal preference. We cannot
expect the Constitution and a stable American system to survive the
onslaught of the Jacobin ideology which permits personal desires to
determine public policy. Such an attitude will not preserve history's
most successful constitutional order nor that noble document "intended to endure for ages to come" upon which it is based.

CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION.
Edited by Terence Balli and J.G.A. Pocock.2 Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press. 1988. Pp. x, 218. $25.00.
Stephen A. Conrad 3

Most of the essays in this volume originated as papers for presentation at an April1987 conference at the Folger Institute for Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies, where Professor Pocock
has for some time now been a leading presence in collective reflection on how best to approach the history of political thought. It's
no surprise, then, that the book offers methodological self-consciousness aplenty. But if anything, Professor Ball's distinctive
methodological commitments are even more apparent here than are
Pocock's. Indeed, some of Ball's fellow contributors to this volume
have taken a stand squarely with him in these commitments, which
look to the current Begriffsgeschichte ("conceptual history") movement in Germany as a guide for improving the study of the history
of Anglo-American political theory. To be sure, several of the essays collected here don't show any special affinity with this new
school of conceptual history; but what's most noteworthy about the
volume overall is how so many of them do.
I.

2.
3.

Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
Harry C. Black Professor of History, The Johns Hopkins University.
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington.
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I

James Farr's essay is the first and maybe the best example. It's
also the broadest in its implications; in fact, it even includes some
remarks addressing the Critical Legal Studies movement wholesale,
and Duncan Kennedy's penchant for structuralism in particular. In
the setting of this volume, however, the most important purpose
served by Farr's essay is to begin to address what is meant by "conceptual change" as a term of art derived from contemporary European methods of conceptual history and adopted by Ball and
Pocock as the titular focus of the book they have assembled.4 Together with Ball and Russell Hanson, who also contributes an essay
here, Farris one of the editors of a recent collection of essays from
Cambridge University Press entitled Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. And the crux of the instant essay by Farr is the
relationship he posits between "constitutional innovation" (which
he takes to be a species of political innovation) and conceptual
change as a "constitutive" agent of such innovation.
The constitutive function in question is, of course, that performed by language itself-a topic rendered almost trite nowadays
in the simplest treatments of it. But Pocock, for one, almost never
lapses into simplicity. Nor does Farr in this essay. He does, however, achieve a welcome clarity, paradoxically by renouncing
pretensions to universalistic, predictive "general theory" in his
"sketch" of a nonetheless broadly applicable account of how the
conceptual language of politics changes over time, and how such
conceptual change is related to changes beyond language.
Invoking Karl Popper, Farr argues that "contradiction" and
"criticism" are the "triggers" par excellence of the "mechanisms"
of conceptual change, quite often in political life, and in the founding of American constitutionalism as a case in point. Moreover his
idea of "contradiction" is as closely identified with politics (or,
more precisely, ideological politics) as it is scrupulously restricted
to the particular meanings to be found in specific historical
contexts.s
This approach leads to a more appreciative view of the capability of "contradiction" than what Farr sees in that paradigm of CLS
exegesis by Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries.6 In contrast to Kennedy, Farr theorizes that
4. See Farr's bibliographic footnote, at 29, esp. his citations to review articles by Melvin Richter. Cf Richter's more recent remarks in 17 PoL. THEORY 296 (1989).
5. Cf Farr, Understanding Conceptual Change Politically, in POLITICAL INNOVATION
AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 24-49 (T. Ballet a/. eds. 1989) 24-49.
6. 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 28 (1979).
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contradictions exist largely between beliefs ... ; and structures (like "practices," a
term I prefer) may be said to be contradictory only to the extent that the beliefs that
constitute them are contradictory. Moreover, contradictions between beliefs beget
"motion," if you like, but it is a motion of reflection and discourse that tries and
often succeeds in propelling us beyond the particular contradiction of its motivation. This suggests--contrary to the claims of Critical Legal Studies-that contradictions are historically contingent and may be resolved. And in resolving them,
doubtless others will occur, even in a world of modest change, much less in a world
of conceptual and practical turbulence of the sort that 1787 symbolizes.

Parr is thus not only more strictly historicist and contextualist
than Kennedy in his approach to the analysis of contradictions,
Parr is also, by virtue of the premium he places on historical context, a good deal more "liberal" and "whiggish"-adjectives that
Pocock himself has suggested are all but inevitably applicable to the
proper study of the history of Anglophone political thought. 1
In contemplating the "successful," "innovative" resolution of
historically contingent contradictions in early American constitutional thought, Parr aligns himself with the still-prevailing "ideological turn" in the historiography of the Founding, in the work of
Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, Pocock, and so many others who
either agree with them or follow their lead if only by rebutting them
in the very terms they have set. This is most obviously what
Begri.ffsgeschichte shares with the ideological school of early American historiography: analysis organized around a canon of political
keywords located in their immediate discursive contexts. Parr
could not be on firmer ground when he points this out and quotes
Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock in support of his own call for a more
concentrated focus on "contradictions" (and "ambiguities") as the
essence of both the Americans' "Revolutionary frame of mind" and
their chief accomplishments as innovative constitutionalists after
1776.

The second essay in this volume, by Gerald Stourzh, is emblematic of the collection in the way it harnesses the lexicographical
format of the Begri.ffsgeschichte method to engaged but disciplined
political science like that of Ball, Parr, and Hanson. Stourzh traces
the "changing meanings" of the term "constitution" in 17th- and
18th-century England and America, with a view to isolating the
"greatest innovations" of the founders in a reconceptualization of
"constitutionalism" so epic that this partly medieval, partly earlymodern concept could become the best promise for securing
"human rights" in the twentieth century.
Yet Stourzh's attention throughout most of his essay is devoted
7.
(I 985).

See, e.g., POCOCK, VIRTUE,

AND

COMMERCE,

AND

HISTORY 1-34, esp. 32-34

200

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 7:197

less to the climactic conceptual innovations of the founders than to
the "roots" of constitutionalism with which he contrasts those innovations. His own summary of his thesis may therefore recall the
variable whiggishness of several generations of Mcllwainians and
neo-Mcllwainians:s
There are [he submits] two quite distinct roots of applying the word "constitution"
to the sphere of government (in the largest sense). The first, and by far the most
important one, is to be found in the application of analogies from nature to politics,
or, to be more precise, in the transfer to bodies corporate or political of a term that
is usually applied to the physical body. The second root is to be found in the rise in
importance, around the middle of the seventeenth century, of the legal term "constitutions" (always used in the plural form), which ultimately can be traced to the
constitutiones of Roman and canon law.

Even for readers to whom this argument sounds familiar there may
be surprises in this essay: characteristically, Stourzh has fresh evidence of formulaic orthodoxies; and as often as not it calls for refining or reconsidering them.
If it's fair to say that the greatest interest of Stourzh's essay lies
in new evidence rather than novel argument, then it's apt to remark
of the subsequent essay, by Pocock, that many of his incidental
points and asides may prove more interesting than his overarching
thesis. That thesis is announced in the title, States, Republics, and
Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective;
which is to say that Pocock marshalls observations about the founders' reconceptions of the terms "state" and "republic," and their
assimilation of the term "empire," in order to fortify what has become one of his signature propositions: "The Constitution of the
United States was a great achievement of early-modem [that is, not
modem] politics, and a great deal may be learned by viewing it in
early-modem terms."
Still, Pocock hardly denies that the founders were innovators:
Not only did Madison and many of his Federalist allies reduce the
heady richness of early modem "republican" theory, by converting
"the word 'republic' to mean 'government through representatives'"; they no less profoundly transformed the meaning of the
term "federal," divorcing it from its sense of the "federative" power
that in early-modem theory was attributed exclusively to sovereign
states. Henceforth "federal" would conventionally denote, in
America and beyond, "a government elected by the people ... [and]
8. See Katz, The Problem of Colonial Legal History, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA:
EsSAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 457·89, esp. 476 and 458
(Greene & Pole eds. 1984); cf generally Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary
Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 23-37 (Beeman eta/. eds. 1987).
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exercising sovereignty [directly] over the individuals composing a
civil society" unto itself. Despite the classic work on this very
theme by Martin Diamond, Samuel Beer, Gordon Wood, and a few
others, Pocock is right, I believe, to urge the importance of pursuing
the study of this transformation of the word "federal," because the
topic does indeed seem to have been "little studied in recent years. " 9
Nevertheless, Pocock's ruminations here on methodology are
likely to be of much wider interest than any proposal for historians
to reorder their substantive research agendas. Not that Pocock lays
out specific prescriptions of method. But some of his obiter dicta
seem to indicate a departure from the almost boundless pluralism
and relativism that have generally marked his oeuvre. To take one
example, he writes as follows, in contemplation of "rules" (no less!)
for historical contextualization and interpretation:
[T]he historian, and in particular the historian of discourse, is committed by his
vocation to operating in an open context; it is, in other words, hard to find any
theoretical limit to the number and variety of contexts in which past historical action may be situated for purposes of interpretation. There must, for this reason, be
rules and disciplinary procedures for admitting new contexts of interpretation and
for demonstrating their relevance and validity; but these rules must themselves be
constantly open to discussion.

Such concern for authority notwithstanding, Pocock is hardly inclined to take up the methods of the jurisprudence of "original intent." Indeed, he and Ball evidently agree on the matter: the
Introduction to the volume, which appears under both their names,
concludes with a memorably elegant argument that historians who
search for "original intent" are deluding themselves as much about
what they are doing as what they are seeking.
II

Although not yet as well known to legal scholars as the established luminaries of the ideological school, the younger historian
Peter Onuf has already made an indispensable place for himself in
partial association with it. His research tends to build upon and
complement it; but he never fails to uncover and synthesize evidence in his own way. His is the fourth essay in the collection.
And although he has entitled it State Sovereignty and the Making of
the Constitution, and aims throughout to explore the meanings of
"state sovereignty" as a discursive concept at the Founding, he
m?re than any of the other conceptual historians contributing to
thts volume takes note of the "pragmatism" of the founders as a
9. My own attempt to pursue the matter is Metaphor and Imagination in James Wilson's Theory of Federal Union, 13 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY I (1988).
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dimension of their "rhetoric." This orientation serves him very well
in restoring to its authentic salience the practical point that at the
Founding, in order to disarm the localism of the Antifederalistseminently reasonable as it must have then seemed-the Federalists
had to make and win an argument "that their goal was to preserve
and strengthen the states, not to destroy them." This is a point that
may just have been decisive in the Ratification debates; and it has
remained continually important throughout the two ensuing centuries of the rhetoric of federalism in America.
Beyond this main point of Onuf's, however, his essay is to my
knowledge unrivalled as a brief exposition of the aspirational character of the Antifederalists' republican theory at its most compelling-to many of their contemporaries if not to many of us today.
Next comes a piece by Garry Wills-short, but with pretensions to an arresting revisionism that goes beyond anything attempted by any of the other contributors. The title is James
Wilson's New Meaning for Sovereignty; and as in the work of virtually every major twentieth-century commentator on Wilson's constitutional theory, the new meaning credited to Wilson is that of
"popular sovereignty" as an operative concept. But Wills departs
radically from earlier commentators in tracing Wilson's conception
of popular sovereignty to none other than Rousseau. According to
Wills, Rousseau was Wilson's "mentor." Wilson's "profound understanding and use" of Rousseau was absolutely "central"-albeit
virtually unacknowledged by Wilson himself and quite "unrecognized" by Wilson's best students to date-in the Lectures on Law,
Wilson's summa on American constitutionalism.
As evidence for such claims, Wills relies on what he takes to be
textual parallels between the Lectures and the Social Contract. Wilson had a "version" of "the general will," and it was Rousseau's.
"For Wilson, no less than for Rousseau, the only legitimate government was a continuing revolution."
There is undoubtedly something to this perspective on Wilson.
But it is difficult at best to assess how much, at least on the basis of
Wills's slim evidence and apodictic approach. Since Wills is said to
be at work on a book about Wilson, I'm resolved to withhold judgment for now, despite my own recent inclination to accord far less
"central" a place than does Wills to voluntarism (not to mention
Rousseau's "general will") in Wilson's constitutional theory .w
10. See Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's
Republican Theory, 1984 SuP. Cr. REv. 359, esp. 38lff (1985); Conrad, James Wilson's "Assimilation of the Common-law Mind," 84 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming). But the best cor-
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III
The sixth essay is a revised version of a prize-winning article
recently published by Daniel Walker Howe in the preeminent journal of early American history, the William and Mary Quarterly.
For this collection Howe has slightly modified the title and the emphasis of that article to bring his work more in line with the "linguistic turn." The title here is The Language of Faculty Psychology
in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS; and his thesis, as he restates it at
the outset, is that:
The conventional paradigm that did most to shape the argument of The Federalist
was eighteenth-century faculty psychology. By examining the authors' use of the
language of faculty psychology we can discover what they meant by such crucial
terms as "interest," "balance," "reason," "passion," and "virtue" in The Federalist.
Only then can we appreciate how they were adapting conventional conceptions to
the needs of a new nation and a new political order.

Nevertheless, this formulation of the thesis doesn't fully convey the force of Howe's novel analysis. Although he scrupulously
avoids what he himself calls the "mistake" of trying "to extract
from [The Federalist] a complete political theory or a comprehensive statement of the relation between government and virtue, such
as one finds in Aristotle," Howe does venture a reinterpretation that
would seem to ground the entire argument of The Federalist on one
"coherent model" of "human nature." This is a reductive exercise
that resembles many another efforts to find, as Howe intimates he
has found, the "key" to both "the rhetoric" and "the argument" of
Publius.
But even if Howe goes too far in claiming to have shown conclusively that "Publius constructed his political science on the
model of faculty psychology," Howe's is a welcome corrective to
tidy ahistorical interpretations of The Federalist. For example,
Howe lays special emphasis on the importance of reading the psychological terminology of Publius in light of the teachings of
Thomas Reid's eighteenth-century Scottish school of moral philosophy, which by the 1780s was already in its early heydey in America.
And in this light Howe finds that, "what looks to twentieth-century
eyes like broker-state pluralism [in The Federalist] was, to Publius's
contemporaries, subsumed within a familiar scheme of eighteenthcentury moral philosophy-namely, the principle of countervailing
passions."
Occasionally I am given pause by the thoroughgoing symmetry
of Howe's interpretation, as when Howe so thoroughly "identifies"
rective to Wills on Wilson remains George M. Dennison, The "Revolution Principle":
Ideology and Constitutionalism in the Thought of James Wilson, 39 REV. PoL. 157 (1977).
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Publius's conception of the executive branch of government with
the "will" as a faculty of the mind that Howe surmises, by analogy:
As the will ought to implement fixed principles and conclusions of the understanding, according to Reid's psychology, so the executive [according to Publius] ought
to enforce only laws enacted by the legislature [the branch of government Howe
says Publius identified with "the understanding"). In identifying the executive with
the will, Publius was not making the presidency supreme but was emphasizing its
rationality and subordination to the law.

This sort of categorical resolution of the celebrated ambiguities of
The Federalist gives little hint of the idea of the energetic and independent, not merely implementing, presidency that Madison
came to propound at the 1787 Federal Convention. Granted,
Howe's essay focuses on the text of The Federalist, deliberately excluding almost all context other than the source literature of eighteenth-century faculty psychology. Therefore nothing Madison, or
Hamilton, or Jay said or wrote outside The Federalist is to Howe's
point; nor is anything written by any of their Federalist allies or
Antifederalist opponents. These, to my mind, unquestionably significant elements of context are excluded from consideration by
Howe so that he can more fully highlight an element of context
usually overlooked. Ultimately he is very persuasive that his distinctive project is worth the candle, however many qualms one
might have about some of the conclusions he reaches along the
way-such as my concern that Howe repeatedly overestimates the
rationalism of Publius (and of Thomas Reid, for that matter).

IV
As I see it, the sixth and seventh essays in the volume, Ball's
and Hanson's, are the center of gravity ofthe entire collection. Like
Farr's, their methods as conceptual historians require them to take
historical contingency seriously; yet they are implicitly as engaged
with our political controversies as with those of the founders. At
the very least, Ball and Hanson evince an attachment to the idea of
political "principles" the value of which ultimately depend little if
at all on historical context. More than that, both Ball and Hanson
privilege one principle-"democracy"-as a virtually suprahistorical, foundational value.
Whatever its merits, such a pairing as that I perceive between
concern for historical/acts and concern with enduring political values is bound to make for a complex point of view. I infer that a selfconsciousness about this complexity is at the heart of the methodological commitments of Ball and company as "conceptual
historians."
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In Ball's essay here (a shortened version of an essay that appears in a more obviously engaged book), 1 1 Ball says he aims to
reexamine the debate between the Federalists and Antifederalists as
a "conceptual-cum-political controversy with an eye to discerning
the argumentative and rhetorical resources used by both sides to
preserve old meanings or, alternatively, to create new ones." Almost as if to emphasize methodology over substance, Ball chooses
as his particular topic the contested meanings at the Founding of
that now so widely mooted term/concept "republicanism." "My
reason," says Ball, "for retreading this oft-trod ground is to bring
into bold relief the conceptual dimensions of the controversy over
ratification." This leads Ball to what is to me his most important
contention: in reviewing some of the aspects of the disputed meaning of "republicanism" in the 1780s, he claims to show "how the
ratification debate took a 'linguistic tum' as the protagonists became increasingly aware of the conceptually constituted character
of their respective views of politics and citizenship."
There is an undisguised critical edge to such a contention. In
characterizing late eighteenth-century "conceptual changes" in the
meaning of republicanism as "rational strategies in a hard-fought
conceptual-cum-political struggle," Ball does not pretend to remain
perfectly neutral as between the two sides in the struggle. He avers
that:
Although both groups [Antifederalist and Federalist] may be said to have inhabited
essentially the same "universe of republican discourse," it is worth noting that while
one wished to maintain the boundaries of that universe, the other wished to redraw
them.

And it is worth noticing that as authority for this view Ball cites
important books by the authors of the two final essays in this collection, The Democratic Imagination in America (1985) by Russell
Hanson, and The Jeffersonian Persuasion (1978) by Lance Banning.
It is the perspective Ball largely shares with Hanson and Banning
that heightens the core "irony" (to use Ball's term) of Madisonian
republicanism: "Even though the meaning of the word 'republic'
may be mutable, Madison contends, the principles of republicanism
are timeless and above the partisan fray." And Ball concludes his
own essay on a note of bracing ambiguity as to the problem of
reaching a historically informed estimation of Federalism qua
republicanism:
In revising the meaning of "republic." Publius had not merely changed the meaning
of a word. He had constituted a world. Whether or in what sense that world was
II. T. BALL, TRANSFORMING POLITICAL DISCOURSE: PoLITICAL THEORY A:"D CRITICAL CONCEPTUAL HISTORY (1988), chap. 3: Reconstituting Republican Discourse.
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any longer recognizably "republican" continues to be a matter of dispute. (emphasis
added)

Ball's pregnant use of the word "recognizably" is a nice transition to the subsequent essay by Hanson, entitled "Commons" and
"Commonwealth" at the American Founding: Democratic Republicanism as the New American Hybrid. Ball is posing the difficult
question Hanson squarely addresses, the question of the historically
unstable but principled distinction and interrelation between "democracy" and "republicanism" that Madison and his allies reworked in order to achieve a Founding widely revered by strong
and weak democrats alike for over two centuries. Moreover, Hanson could not be plainer that the Federalists' "success," such as it
was in their own day and thereafter, was not the function of a prevailing "consensus" on fundamental political values.
As Hanson says, by 1787, "[f]or the Antifederalists ... the
Revolution was over." Not so for their innovative opponents: "If
the Antifederalists desired a popularly limited government, the Federalists advanced the idea of a limited popular government ... [and
to be] less popular in orientation [was to be] not so obviously republican in character." (emphasis added).
The import of Hanson's adverb "obviously" is the same as that
of Ball's "recognizably": historical contingency notwithstanding,
all is not flux; there is a shape to some processes and events that
yields a fixed point of reference. How else are we to read Hanson's
cadence: "[By the age of Andrew Jackson, d]emocracy had proved
irresistible. Madison's carefully wrought distinction between democratic and republican forms of government had broken down, and
the work of the Revolution had truly been completed"?
Hanson's is, however, something of a "false" cadence, especially in relation to Lance Banning's essay, which completes this
collection. Because Banning has been such a prominent and
thoughtful spokesman on behalf of the importance of republicanism
in early American history, 12 the title alone of his essay is especially
significant: Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking. For many republican theorists of the eighteenth century and neo-republicans of the twentieth, "virtue" is a
conceptual keyword of almost talismanic overtones. And often its
charm lies in its legitimation of a civic culture that emphasizes the
sacrifice of self-interest to the public interest.
Whatever the meaning of a politics of virtue could or should be
today, Banning wants to remove this notion of sacrifice from the
12. Cf Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New
American Republic, 63 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1986).
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central place some historians have accorded It m reconstructing
Madisonian republicanism. Instead, Banning finds the "most essential meaning" of "virtue"-to Madison and to most Americans
throughout the eighteenth century-in the ethos of eighteenth-century British opposition politics: "a jealous, vigilant commitment to
the public life: continuing participation in a politics that trusted
only limited responsibilities to national officials and demanded, even
so, that these officials be continuously watched for any signs of an
appearance of a separate set of interests."
Some might say that this conception of Madisonian republicanism collapses republicanism into liberalism altogether. On its face
Banning's point as quoted here might be interpreted to say as much.
But attentive regard to exactly how he reaches his point doesn't admit of so facile a synthesis-or, indeed, of definitive synthesis at all.
Yet paradoxically, by refusing to isolate the thought of a theorist
like Madison from its immediate contexts, Banning illustrates the
coherence of an-not the-eighteenth-century republican tradition
identifiable by its essence, despite the impossibility of giving a comprehensive account of that tradition.
Banning thus reminds us that it is this essentialism-and a
faith in the meaningfulness of essences inhering in political concepts
and their keywords-that gives a unity (although not a unanimity)
to this collection of essays. It is not the essentialism of Aristotle, or
of Montesquieu, but of a group proceeding under the banner of
"conceptual history." And as much as most of them owe to Aristotle or Montesquieu or both, they take pains to derive their essentialism from historical data unimagined by either.

